Battle of Spionkop
The battle of Spionkop was where the most incompetence of British leadership
was shown
 The
Battle of Spioenkop was the second attempt of determined British commander-in-chief
General Buller to relieve the siege of Ladysmith. After the unsuccessful
first attempt at Colenso Buller desperately needed a victory, and concentrated
on the far right flank of the Boer strongholds at Spioenkop.
General Buller’s defeat
at Colenso on 15th December 1899 left him with the same strategic conundrum;
how to relieve Ladysmith. Before he assumed the position of commander-in-chief
in South Africa, Buller had urged that the small British force in Natal must
remain on the defensive behind the Tugela River in the face of a Boer invasion
of the colony. General Penn Symons had ignored this advice and advanced to
the northern tip of Natal, where he had won the battle of Talana -dying in
the process- a minor success that did little to stem the Boer invasion. General
Sir George White, arriving in the colony with reinforcements, had not felt
able to pull his troops back from Ladysmith behind the Tugela, although fundamentally
he agreed with Buller, and found himself besieged in the town with most of
the British troops in the colony.
 Boers at the Battle of Spion Kop Similar
actions in Mafeking and Kimberley left British garrisons besieged by forces
of Boers in the North West of South Africa. Instead of having a free hand
to counter invade the two Boer republics, The Orange Free State and the Transvaal,
Buller had to attempt the relief of these three towns. In particular it was
inconceivable that White be left to surrender to the Boers with 10,000 British
troops. General Botha and his Boer burgher army were enabled to entrench
on the line of the Tugela River and await attack by Buller’s Natal
Field Force. At Colenso Buller had attempted an assault straight up the railway
line to Ladysmith, hoping that White would mount a simultaneous assault from
Ladysmith against the Boer rear.
 Colenso was a severe reverse for Buller
which left him with the problem of crossing the Tugela unresolved. British
troops crossing the Tugela River to attack Spion Kop White’s losses
in the Boer assault on Wagon Hill and Caesar’s Camp on 6th January
1900 caused him to signal to Buller that he was unable to make any further
foray to assist the relief operation. Relieved of the obligation to attempt
a joint attack with White, Buller planned the next attack further west on
the Tugela, to outflank the main Boer entrenched positions around the north-south
railway line. Substantial reinforcements arrived in Natal from Britain in
Warren’s Fourth Division. Once they reached the main army Buller moved
to the West and began his assault across the Tugela. The point chosen for
the attack lay opposite the Rangeworthy Hills, of which Spion Kop was one.
Major General Lyttelton’s brigade of rifle regiments initially crossed
the river at Potgeiter’s Drift to the East of the main attack, at a
point where the river bending in a loop to the South protected the crossing
from enfilade fire. British casualties coming down from the Battle of Spion
Kop Lieutenant General Warren with 13,000 men and 36 guns had the task of
crossing the river further west at Trikhardt’s Drift and pushing up
onto the Rangeworthy Hills, thereby diverting Boer attention so that Lyttelton
could punch through to Ladysmith. Buller planned to follow Lyttelton’s
attack with a further force of 8,000 men and 22 guns. Warren’s force
set off for the Tugela on 15th January 1900, beginning the crossing of the
river on 17th January.
On 19th January Warren was still bringing his column
across the river and had not begun his attack although his artillery opened
an extensive bombardment along the Tabanyama Ridge immediately opposite Trikhardt’s
Drift. In the meantime Botha realising the threat to his extreme right flank
brought Boer commandoes and guns to the area, settling them into the threatened
hills and opening fire on Warren’s waiting troops. Losing patience
with Warren’s lack of urgency on 23rd January 1900 Buller rode forward
and ordered Warren to begin the attack on the Rangeworthy Hills. Warren’s
plan was to climb and capture the hill of Spion Kop, which he considered
to be the key to the Rangeworthy position. With his troops established on
Spion Kop he would overlook the open ground leading to Ladysmith.
The column
assigned to take Spion Kop comprised a party of Thorneycroft’s Mounted
Infantry, battalions from Woodgate’s Lancastrian brigade and sappers
of the Royal Engineers to dig the necessary entrenchments. The column made
a night approach finally setting off up the steep side of the hill and arriving
at the top in the early morning. The hill was shrouded in mist. A small Boer
picket fled, leaving Warren’s men in possession of the summit, which
the sappers began to entrench. It seemed to the British that the relief of
Ladysmith was near at hand. The Boer picket rushed to warn Botha who directed
the Boer guns in the area to fire on the summit of Spion Kop. A few hundred
Boer burghers were persuaded to climb the hill and attempt to recapture it
from the British.
On Spion Kop the mist prevented the British force from
realising that the area occupied was insufficient to hold the summit and
that their position was overlooked by higher features. The infantry soldiers
fell asleep after the strenuous climb while the team of sappers dug the trenches.
The entrenched area extended to just an acre. Murderous Acre at Spion Kop
The British trench in "the murderous acre" on Spion Kop after the
battle The bombardment began and the Boers on the lip of the summit of the
hill fired into the entrenched area; which the British troops were to find
was too small and too shallow. Under the storm of artillery and rifle fire
the British troops in the trenches on the summit suffered heavily. General
Woodgate was an early casualty, as were the commanding officers of the Royal
Lancasters and the Royal Engineers, leaving the British troops without senior
command. Warren in the meanwhile ordered General Coke to take reinforcements
to the summit: Imperial Light Infantry, 2nd Dorsets and 2nd Middlesex. Hart
and other senior officers urged Warren to attack Tabanyama. Instead Warren
signaled Lyttleton that a diversion was needed. On the Boer side the fighting
was just as desperate.
Only volunteers could be persuaded to climb to the
top of Spion Kop and the surrounding heights. The hillside was littered with
Boer casualties and many were killed on the summit. The sense of desperation
was as great on the Boer side as on the British. On Buller’s urgings
Warren put Thorneycroft in command on the crest of Spion Kop. Some of the
despairing and exhausted British troops attempted to surrender to the Boers.
Thorneycroft on taking command ordered the Boers back and shouted that there
was to be no surrender.
At the critical moment Coke’s reinforcements
burst onto the hilltop, although Coke himself stayed beneath the crest and
settled down for a nap, so it is reported. The most critical battle for the
British Empire in many decades was left to a colonel to fight. At this point
in the battle Lyttelton launched his diversionary attack. The 2nd Scottish
Rifles climbed Spion Kop to join Thorneycroft’s troops while 1st Rifle
Brigade attacked straight up the Twin Peaks to the East of Spion Kop. Schalk
Burger, commanding the Boers on the Twin Peaks, panicked at the assault on
his position and many of his burghers made for the rear, leaving the 60th
to take the summit of the ridge. The roasting hot day came to a close and
Warren began to organise reliefs and supplies for the hard pressed infantry
on the summit of Spion Kop. Still under artillery fire Thorneycroft and his
men were at the end of their tether.
Warren had sent Thorneycroft no orders
of any sort during the day, other than his appointment in command, and he
now sent no message to inform Thorneycroft that substantial reinforcements
were on their way. Not until 9pm did the reliefs begin to climb the hill.
On the Boer side the effect of the battle had been just as devastating and
the diversionary attack by the 60th Rifles had been the last straw. The Boers
had left the summit of Spion Kop. Thorneycroft did not realise it, but he
had won the battle. Instead of moving forward after the retreating enemy
Thorneycroft resolved to withdraw off the hill with the confused and demoralised
remnants of the Lancashire battalions, Middlesex, Scottish Rifles and his
own Imperial Light Infantry.
The reinforcements began to arrive and a vigorous
dispute developed, a newly arrived commanding officer insisting that the
hill must be held. Thorneycroft was adamant. He was in command and he was
taking his troops down from this hellish hill top which they could no longer
hold. At dawn the next day the Boer leaders saw that their men had re-occupied
Spion Kop. The battle had been won.
Warren’s force trailed back across
the Tugela. The second attempt to force through to Ladysmith had failed disastrously.
Medical orderly looking for the wounded after the battle Casualties: The
British lost 1,500 casualties, 243 of them dead in the trench on the peak
of Spion Kop. The Boers suffered 335 casualties.
News of Spion
Kop caused consternation in Britain and nearly brought down the government.
The cabinet was at a loss to work out what could have gone wrong. The decision
was made to send out Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener to take over as commander
in chief and chief of staff in South Africa. Spion Kop drove the final nail
into the coffin of Buller’s reputation. With the end of the war Buller
was dismissed from the army, a terrible end to a worthy life of service to
the British Crown, in spite of his failings. Buller’s incompetence
as a general was fully demonstrated at Spion Kop. In spite of his overwhelming
strength he allowed the battle to be decided by a few hundred men fighting
in what came to be called the murderous acre, on the top of a hill beyond
any proper command control. In spite of his reservations as to Warren’s
conduct of the battle Buller failed to intervene.
Curiously Spionkop was
something of a disaster for the Boers. Many of the Boers assumed that, as
after Majuba in the First Boer War, the British would sue for peace and leave
them their independence. Numbers of burghers including Botha, considering
the war as good as won, went home, leaving insufficient men to resist Buller’s
next and decisive attacks at Val Krantz and Pieter’s Hill. Denys Reitz,
author of Commando, was one of the Boer volunteers who climbed onto Spion
Kop and fought through the day, finally despairing of success and pulling
back. It is an irony that in 1918 Reitz commanded 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers
in France.
Today Spioenkop also offers an amazing panoramic view of the entire Northern
and Central Drakensberg, and especially breathtaking views of this world
heritage site at sunset. The battle site is open to visitors daily, and there
is a self guided trail which lead visitors amongst the trenches, graves and
monuments.
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